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Abstract: 
 This paper investigates the economic relationship between Japan and South Korea by 
incorporating disaggregated output measures.  Using a factor-augmented vector autoregression 
(FAVAR) model, we conduct several experiments to test the nature of the interdependence, both 
in the aggregate and by sector. We find that South Korean output shocks affect the Japanese 
economy in a significant manner, whereas Japanese output shocks have a limited effect on South 
Korea.  By further examining the transmission mechanism of sectoral output shocks and 
comparing them with the direction of sectoral trade, we find evidence of cross-border production 
sharing, which explains the asymmetric results seen in the aggregate output. 
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 Japan and South Korea are undoubtedly two of the major economic players in Asia as 
well as in the world.  Their combined PPP-adjusted GDP is $6.3 trillion, which accounts for 
roughly 8% of the world GDP.3 GDP per capita is $38,528 dollars per person for Japan (ranked 
28th overall) and $26,482 dollars per person for South Korea (ranked 33rd overall)4, and both are 
member countries of the OECD.  
Japan and South Korea’s global presence is particularly large in the production of certain 
commodities.  The two countries account for 17.2% of the global production of “motor vehicles, 
trailers, and semitrailers” and 15.3% of the “radio, television, and communications equipment”.5  
In some industries such as semiconductors, passenger cars, and petro-chemical products, Japan 
and South Korea compete head to head in the global market, whereas in many other “niche” 
industries they provide intermediate goods to each other and form a complementary relationship.  
The relationship between Japan and South Korea was the subject of a study by Selover 
(2004).  The author used macroeconomic data between 1960 and 2002 and found that Japan had 
moderate transmission effects on the South Korean economy, but South Korea did not have 
much effect on the Japanese economy.  But circumstances have changed since then.  While 
Japan has suffered continuously from the two-decades long economic slump that has hurt its 
competitiveness in the global market, South Korea quickly recovered from the Asian Financial 
Crisis and steadily expanded its production capability thereafter.  During 2003.1-2012.12, the 
average growth rate of the overall industrial production for South Korea was 6.7% per year while 
for Japan it was a meager 0.7%.6 In terms of bilateral trade dependency, Japanese export share 
                                                            
3 Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 2012. 
4 Source: United Nations, National Account Main Aggragates Database, 2013 
5 Source: Joint Study Committee, Joint Study Report for an FTA Among China, Japan and Korea, December 16, 2011.  
6 Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, 2013 
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for South Korea has mildly risen from 6% to 7%, while the South Korean export share for Japan 
has fallen sharply from 12% to 7%, partially substituted by the rising export share of China.7 
At the regional level, Asia as a whole continued its extraordinary economic growth after 
2002, and further increased its economic presence in the global market.  Most noticeably, China 
has become the second largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan.  At the same time, China 
has also become the largest trading partner for both Japan (18.1% of total exports, 21.3% of total 
imports) and South Korea (24.5% of exports, 15.5% of imports), surpassing the US and other 
developed countries.8  
Finally, the world has experienced a dramatic shift in the trade structure during the last 
decade.  In particular, the production activity in many sectors has become “fragmented” into 
several production processes that are scattered across the region. Countries involved in this form 
of trade have become more closely tied to each other through vertical production linkages 
(Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001).  South Korea has always been the front-runner in adopting this 
new form of trade, along with other smaller Asian countries such as Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Malaysia.  Japan was initially slow in adjusting to this new trend, but it is now quickly catching 
up (Miroudot and Ragoussis, 2009).   
In view of all the new developments, this paper aims to answer the following questions: 
what is the current economic relationship between Japan and South Korea? Has it changed from 
the finding of Selover (2004)?  Does vertical production linkage explain business cycle 
transmission between the two countries?  To address these questions, we adopt a factor-
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) approach that utilizes a large set of time series data 
consisting of disaggregated industrial production output measures. The disaggregated series 
                                                            
7 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2012. 
8 Source: Europa Publications, The Far East and Australasia 2013, 2013 
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serve two purposes.  First, they enlarge the information set relevant to business cycle 
transmission that may occur at the sector level.  Second, they are used to impose restrictions to 
identify the orthogonal output shocks. We also utilize information from the Asian International 
Input-Output Table to encode the trade relationship among several major economies in the 
region.  The impulse responses drawn from the estimated FAVAR are used to characterize the 
dynamics of the transmission mechanism between the two countries.  
We find that recent developments may have changed the relationship between Japan and 
South Korea.  In particular, the impulse responses show that the Japanese overall output shock 
no longer affect South Korea, instead the South Korean overall output shock affects Japan in a 
significant manner. This result is contrary to Selover (2004)’s finding.  When we look at the 
responses of individual sectors, the same type of asymmetry is also found.  For example, while 
output in the Japanese electrical machinery and chemical sectors responds strongly to the South 
Korean overall output shock, output of these sectors in South Korea does not respond to the 
Japanese overall output shock.  
Furthermore, using sector-level output shocks in the two key sectors (electrical 
machinery, motor vehicles), we find the same type of asymmetric output responses for Japan and 
South Korea.  The Japanese sectors benefit much more from South Korean sectoral output 
shocks than does South Korea from the same shocks occurring in Japan.  The transmission 
mechanism, combined with the sectoral trade flows, suggests that the intermediate goods demand 
of South Korean sectors may have created positive spillover effects for the Japanese sectors, 
strongly indicating the existence of production complementarity related to these two sectors.   
In addition to our above main findings, we confirm that both US and Chinese output 
shocks have positive spillover effects on Japan and South Korea, but the US output shock 
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appears to have a smaller impact on the South Korean economy than it does on the Japanese 
economy.  This result partially supports the view that Asia is “decoupling” from the rest of the 
world (Kose, Otrok, and Prasad, 2012).  The impulse responses also show that Japan benefits 
more from the US and Chinese output shocks than does South Korea.  Finally, we confirm that 
the main result is robust to the use of different datasets as well as alternative assumption 
regarding the observed output factor. 
 There are several studies that use FAVAR to examine the transmission of business cycle 
across borders.  For example, Mumtaz and Surico (2009) study the effect of an international real 
activity shock on the UK economy by extracting principal components from nationally 
aggregated variables covering multiple countries and use short-run restrictions to identify the 
shock.9  This paper differs from the existing FAVAR studies in that it is the first to employ 
disaggregated output measures to examine economic relationship between two countries.   Our 
method to identify shocks is also unique and justifiable because it relies on sectoral trade 
information in the international input-output table.  This approach is different from studies that 
exclusively rely on disaggregated variables, such as commodity-level trade statistics, or the 
international input-output tables to study industrial interdependence between different countries 
or different regions.  
Section 2 gives the motivation for this study and a review of the literature.  Section 3 
explains the methodology and data used.  Section 4 presents the main results.  Section 5 provides 
further analysis using different types of output shocks.  Section 6 checks the robustness of the 
main results.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                            






To motivate our analysis, we start this section by updating the analysis of Selover (2004) who 
analyzed the business cycle transmission between South Korea and Japan during 1960-2002 
using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach.   The SVAR model in Selover (2004) 
has seven endogenous variables and three exogenous variables, and the author imposes short-run 
restrictions to identify the structural shocks.  The output measures are monthly indexes of 
industrial production (IIP) for Japan and South Korea. We apply the same identification strategy 
for three samples: 1990.01-2012.12, 1990.01-1999.12, and 2000.01-2012.12.10  
 Figure 1 shows the impulse responses for the full sample and two subsamples.  The left 
panels show how the Japanese output responds to an unexpected innovation in the South Korean 
overall output (“South Korean output shock”), whereas the right panels show how the South 
Korean output responds to an innovation in the Japanese overall output (“Japanese output 
shock”).  For the overall sample 1990.01-2012.12, we observe that the Japanese output responds 
positively to the South Korean output shock, whereas South Korean output does not respond 
much to the Japanese output shock. In the middle two panels (1990.01-1999.12), neither output 
responds significantly to an output shock in the other country.  In the last two panels (2000.01-
2012.12), only the Japanese output responds positively to the South Korean output shock, but the 
South Korean output does not respond significantly to the Japanese output shock, consistent with 
the overall sample. This result is opposite to the finding of Selover (2004), which finds moderate 
transmission of shock from Japan to South Korea but limited effects from South Korea to Japan 
during 1960-2002. 
                                                            




 There are several possible reasons why the bilateral transmission mechanism may have 
reversed in the recent two decades.  One is the dynamic change in the global trade structure 
referred to as global production sharing (also known as vertical specialization, fragmentation, 
and outsourcing) that has occurred since the 1990s.11 In general, if there is a vertical production 
linkage that involve more than two countries, focusing solely on the bilateral economic 
relationship could be misleading in terms of how one country is economically exposed to another 
(Bems, Johnson, and Yi, 2010).  Vertical production linkage is most widely seen in electronics, 
automobiles, machine tools, and various metal products (Athukorala, 2011), which are all sectors 
that Japan and South Korea have relatively large shares in the global market.12 The rapid 
development of global production sharing in these sectors may have contributed in changing the 
nature of the transmission mechanism between Japan and South Korea, in combination with 
other changing environments that have occurred in recent years (e.g., improved air transportation, 
an increased use of computers in manufacturing, an increase in industrial agglomerations within 
the Asia-Pacific region, lowered tariffs for intermediate goods trade, and an expansion of 
preferential trade agreements).13 
 Another related phenomenon is the so-called decoupling/recoupling of emerging Asia 
from the rest of the world.  In this literature, South Korea is usually treated as part of emerging 
Asia whereas Japan is often treated as part of the rest of the world.14 On one hand, Kose, Otrok 
and Prasad (2012) have noted that in recent years Asia has gained independence from the rest of 
the world in terms of achieving economic growth (“decoupling”), with the most notable changes 
                                                            
11 These terms are used in slightly different contexts depending on what aspect is emphasized.  For example, Hummels, Ishii, and 
Yi (2001) have expounded upon the notion of vertical specialization, which considers how a country’s exports are produced 
through importing the parts and components from other countries. 
12 For empirical studies on global production sharing in individual industries, see for example Amador and Cabral (2009), Ando 
(2007), Kimura, Takahashi, and Hayakawa (2007), Nishitateno (2013), Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, and Gereffi (2008).  
13 For more discussion on the changing environment surrounding trades in general, see Helpman (2006), Hummels (2007), 
Kimura (2006), Orefice and Rocha (2014), Williams (2013). 
14 Japan’s treatment as part of the rest of the world is partly because of its economic status as a developed country and the 
prolonged recession that makes it distinct from the other developing Asian countries.   
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happening in the fast-growing China and ASEAN countries.  On the other hand, Kim, Lee and 
Park (2011) argue that Asia has not decoupled, but rather strengthened its ties with the rest of the 
world (“recoupling”).  Using a panel VAR approach, Kim, Lee and Park (2011) show that 
positive spillover effects between the emerging East Asia (including South Korea) and the G7 
countries (including Japan) have strengthened in both directions since the 2000s.15  
 
2.2. Related literature  
 In recent years, there has been a surge of studies examining how sectoral composition 
affects economic interdependence.  For example, Calderon, Chong, and Stein (2007) show that 
when the industrial compositions of two countries are similar, their business cycles tend to 
synchronize.  Crosby (2003), Kumakura (2006), and Shin and Wang (2003) find the same 
conclusion for countries in the Asia-Pacific region.   
There have been two leading explanations in the literature for why sectoral similarity 
leads to high business cycle synchronization.  One is that their sectoral outputs tend to be 
correlated through common sector-specific shocks, resulting in the overall output correlation 
(e.g., Imbs, 2004).  Another explanation is that if the sector pairs of two countries have a large 
trade volume, the international transactions from both directions would serve as a conduit for 
transmitting economic shocks across borders.  Studies have shown that trade volume at the sector 
level is a robust predictor of business cycle synchronization (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 
2010).16  
                                                            
15 Hirata and Otsu (2011) demonstrate that the efficiency improvement of South Korea and Taiwan has created a positive 
spillover effect on the Japanese economy since the mid-1980’s.  For more on the decoupling/recoupling literature, see Bordo and 
Helbling (2011), Kim, Kose, and Plummer (2003), Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2008), Park and Shin (2009). 
16 In general, the association between overall trade and business cycle synchronization is ambiguous.  If trade reflects the 
comparative advantage, the business cycles of two countries are expected to be less synchronized because the industry-specific 
shocks would make the countries less associated with each other.  However, empirical studies have found that larger trade 




Recently, a third argument, focusing on the vertical linkage across fragmented production 
processes, has gained momentum in the literature.  This is particularly useful in describing the 
business cycle synchronization of smaller Asian countries that specialize in certain sectors such 
as automobiles (e.g., Thailand) or electronics (e.g., Taiwan, Malaysia).  Several theoretical 
models have been built to examine whether such linkages could significantly affect the economic 
interdependence across countries at the aggregate level.17  However, there is as yet no firm 
consensus as to what form of vertical production linkage matters most for the transmission of 
business cycles.18   
On the empirical front, several approaches have been established to study sectoral 
interdependencies across borders.  One is to directly examine the trade flows between countries 
at the commodity level.  For example, Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) and Athukorala (2011) 
focus on the trade in parts and components among many countries/regions.  They show that in 
recent years Asia has gained its global presence in many information and technology related 
commodities, but not much presence in the automotive related commodities.   
Another approach, which we adopt in our paper, is to study the international input-output 
table covering multiple countries and sectors.  For example, utilizing the OECD input-output 
table of countries, Ng (2010) finds that vertical specialization affects business cycle 
synchronization positively.19  Adopting a slightly different approach, Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar 
                                                            
17 For example, Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008) assume that goods that involve vertically integrated production process have a 
lower elasticity of substitution than horizontally differentiated goods.  They demonstrate that if trade volume is held constant, an 
increase in production sharing generates a positive cross-country correlation in output.  Bergin, Feenstra, and Hansen (2011) 
assume that offshoring sectors have a varying unit labor cost that triggers adjustment in the offshoring margin and use this 
mechanism to explain why offshoring industries in the low wage countries tend to have a larger volatility in employment 
compared to the high wage countries.  Yi (2010) and Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) have demonstrated that when vertical 
specialization is present, trade cost would have magnifying effect on the trade volume.  For other related studies, see Ambler, 
Cardia, and Zimmermann (2002) and Tesar (2008). 
18 Johnson (2014) demonstrates in his model that vertical specialization plays only a quantitatively minor role in transmitting 
shocks across borders.  Bridgman (2013) demonstrates that trade associated with vertical specialization does not explain much of 
the import volatility in a country, making it questionable that it serves as an effective transmission channel. 
19 See also Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012).  For studies that exclusively focus on Asia, see Suder, 
Liesch, Inomata, Mihailova, and Meng (2014), Yamazawa, Nohara, and Osada (1986). 
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(2008) study the input-output structure between US multinationals and their foreign affiliates by 
focusing on their product sharing activities at the firm level.  They too confirm that (intra-firm) 
vertical production linkages contribute to business cycle synchronization across countries.  
However, the downside of this approach is that data are only available in low frequencies or for 
limited sample periods and hence are not well suited to study the dynamics of the transmission 
mechanism of business cycle.  We overcome this limitation by combining the international input-
output table and monthly macroeconomic time series such as industrial production.  
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
3.1 Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) 
Compared with traditional vector autoregressions, FAVAR has the advantage of 
incorporating a large set of information into a few factors and using these factors in the VAR 
analysis.  Our FAVAR model closely follows the one developed in the seminal paper of 
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).  One difference between our method and theirs is the 
identification strategy: in our paper shocks are identified using trade information based on the 
international input-output table.  
Our FAVAR estimation involves two steps.  First, we use principal component analysis 
to obtain the estimates of factors 𝐹!   ≡ 𝐹!,!  ,… ,𝐹!,!   ′ that are obtained from the large panel of  
dataset.  These factors are expected to capture the dynamics of the international macroeconomic 
factors that are commonly shared across all seven countries included in our sample.  The 
observed time series 𝑋! ≡ 𝑋!,! ,… ,𝑋!,! ′ are associated with the (unknown) factors as follows, 




where 𝜆 is the N × K matrix of factor loadings and 𝑒! ≡ 𝑒!,! ,… , 𝑒!,! ′ is the idiosyncratic 
component of each series.  In Equation (1), the factors and factor loadings are not separately 
identifiable, unless some restriction is applied.  To solve this problem, we apply the commonly 
applied restriction 𝑇!!𝐹!𝐹 = 𝐼 on the factors, where 𝐹 = 𝐹!,… ,𝐹! ! denotes a T x K matrix of 
unobserved macroeconomic factors that are stacked up over sample period t =1,…T.20 
Second, we estimate a VAR of the form, 
𝐹!
𝑋!,!!"#
=   Φ 𝐿
𝐹!!!
𝑋!,!!!!"#
+ 𝜐!  ,                                                              (2) 
where 𝐹! = 𝐹!,! ,… ,𝐹!,! ′ is the vector of estimated factors in which the direct dependence of 
𝑋!,!!"#on 𝐹! is removed (as explained below). 𝑋!,!!"# is the output series of interest and is treated as 
an observed factor.  The choice of 𝑋!,!!"# depends on the output shock and will be switched 
between different indexes of industrial production.  For example, when studying the effects of a 
Japanese output shock on South Korean output, we use the Japanese overall output as the 𝑋!,!!"#.  
Φ 𝐿  is a lag polynomial matrix of order P.  The reduced form residuals 𝜐! ≡ [  𝜐!,! , 𝜐!,!!"#]′ can be 
further expressed as,  
𝜐! = 𝐑𝜀! ,                                                                                  (3) 
where 𝐑  is a square matrix and 𝜀! ≡ [𝜀!,! , 𝜀!,!!"#]′ is the structural shock.  To recover the structural 
shock, we adopt the standard recursiveness assumption which implies that the international 
factors 𝐹! in Equation (2) respond only with a lag to the unexpected change in the domestic 
output 𝑋!,!!"!. 
                                                            
20 The actual estimation of factors and factor loading is done as follows.  First, we estimate the factors by minimizing the squared 
residuals in Equation (1) while treating the unknown loading as given. Next, we estimate the loadings using principal component 
analysis.  Under some regularity conditions on the error structures, the factor loading can be consistently estimated as the first K 
eigenvectors of the variance-covariance matrix of X (Stock and Watson, 2005).  Note that when estimating the principal 






In order to identify the observed output shock 𝜀!,!!"#, we follow the method described in 
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).  First, we select a set of slow-moving variables from the 
dataset that are by assumption not affected by 𝜀!,!!"# contemporaneously.  Second, we apply 
principal component analysis to these slow-moving variables to obtain factors 
𝐹!! ≡ 𝐹!,!! ,… ,𝐹!!,!
! .  Finally, we regress 𝐹!  on 𝐹!! as  
𝐹! = 𝑏!𝐹!! + 𝑏!𝑋!,!!"# + 𝑢!, 
and use the regression coefficient 𝑏! to remove the direct dependence of 𝐹! on 𝑋!,!!"# as follows, 
𝐹! = 𝐹! − 𝑏!𝑋!,!!"#.                                                                                                                                  (4) 
This procedure assures that the output shock 𝜀!,!!"# is orthogonal to the shocks of the principal 
components, and it can be treated as an independent structural shock in the FAVAR analysis.  
 
 3.2 Identification of Shocks  
The output shock is an unexpected increase in the production activity in a given country 
or sector that can be transmitted through trade in either intermediate or final goods.21  Our 
identification strategy is to find sectors that are unlikely to respond to the output shock in a 
foreign country within a given month and treat those sectors’ output as slow-moving variables.   
For identification of the country-level output shock (e.g., a Japanese overall output 
shock), we first measure the trade volume between a given sector (e.g., South Korean electrical 
machinery) and the country in which the shock occurs (e.g., Japan).  We consider both exports 
and imports as part of the trade volume to make sure that there is no spillover effect through 
either demand or supply.  Next, we divide the above trade volume between the sector and the 
country with the overall bilateral trade volume of the two countries (e.g., Japan and South Korea) 
                                                            
21 This notion of a shock is relatively close to the shocks to “real activity” or “economic activity” used in other FAVAR studies. 




to obtain the trade share of the sector.  Finally, we compare the calculated trade share with a 
predetermined threshold value.  In particular, if the trade share is below 0.5 percent, the sectoral 
output is selected as the slow-moving variable.22   
For identification of the sector-level output shock (e.g., Japanese electrical machinery 
output shock), the same process is applied as above.  The difference is that the trade share is now 
calculated as the ratio of trade volume between two sector pairs (e.g., Japanese-South Korean 
electrical machinery) over the trade volume between the sector of interest and the partner country 
(e.g., South Korea). Again, if the share falls below 0.5 percent, we select that sector’s output as 
the slow-moving variable.   
The selected slow-moving variables are used to calculate 𝐹! following Equation (4). We 
set the number of extracted factors to three based on the test in Hallin and Liska (2007).23  In the 
FAVAR context, this means that we extract two unobserved factors (K = 2) using the principal 
components analysis and augment the output series of interest (𝑋!,!!"#) as the third factor.  We set 
the number of principal components extracted from the slow-moving variables equal to K, 
following Bernanke et al. (2005). The lag length is set to P = 2, as suggested by the Schwarz 
BIC criteria.24    
In estimation, we also include a recession dummy as an exogenous variable, guided by a 
visual inspection of the time series of selected variables (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix).  
Therefore our estimated model is modified as, 
𝐹!
𝑋!,!!"#
=   Φ 𝐿
𝐹!!!
𝑋!,!!!!"#
+ 𝜷!!𝑑! + 𝜐!  ,                                       (5) 
                                                            
22 We have also experimented with different threshold values (0.25%, 1%) to check the robustness of our main result.  We find 
that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of different threshold values. 
23 We also experimented with the information criterion proposed by Bai and Ng (2007), which suggests 3-5 factors depending on 
the test parameters used.  Even when the larger number of factors are applied, the main result in the paper remained largely 
unaffected. 
24 Using the Schwarz BIC criteria, some of the specifications prescribed lag lengths of one.  However, for purposes of 
comparability we standardized by adopting a lag length of two months.  The results were not very sensitive to lag length. 
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where 𝑑! is the recession dummy that takes the value of one during 2007.11 – 2009.06 and zero 
otherwise.  The dates are determined based on the recession dates of four countries (US, China, 
Japan, South Korea) provided by NBER for the US and OECD for the rest.  For comparison 
purpose, the size of the shock is set to be the same for all shocks, and it is equal to a one-half 
percentage point of the shock variable. 
 
3.3 Variables Used in Estimating the FAVAR 
While our analysis focuses primarily on the index of industrial production of Japan and 
South Korea, we utilize a total of 127 macroeconomic variables of seven countries (Japan, South 
Korea, US, China, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia) collected from several sources.  These countries 
jointly form a complicated production network in the Asia-Pacific region.25  These variables are 
monthly and cover the period of 2000.01 – 2012.12 following the Asian Financial Crisis (T = 
156).  The list of variables consists of industrial production at the national level (for all seven 
countries) and by sectors (for Japan, South Korea, and the US).  We additionally include trade 
volumes, consumer price indexes, spot exchange rates, monetary aggregates, and short-term 
interest rates at the national level.  Trade volume is relevant because sectoral interdependence is 
likely to depend on the trade channel across multiple countries.  The remaining variables are 
used in Selover (2004) to proxy the financial channel. The description of variables is provided in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix.  All variables except for the short-term interest rates are transformed 
                                                            
25 To illustrate why US, China, Taiwan matter in studying the relationship between Japan and South Korea, consider iPhone as an 
example.  An increase in Japanese output increases the demand for iPhone in Japan, which has over 50% share in the Japanese 
smartphone market.  As widely reported, China does most of the assembly of iPhone through Taiwanese companies (Foxconn, 
Pegatron), and Japanese machine tools are used in the factories.  In the production process, Apple Inc. in the US provides key 
components such as software, while non-US companies supply some of the high-tech parts such as LCD panels, chipsets, 
batteries (South Korea), DRAMs, flash memories (Taiwan), cameras, inductor coils, and data storages (Japan).  This example 
indicates that the transmission of Japanese or South Korean output shock can go through other countries in a complicated fashion.  
Studies point out that Thailand is now heavily involved in global supply chain of automobile (“Detroit of the East”).  Malaysia 
has large industry Park in Penang that serves as an electronic parts and components hub in Asia.  
15 
 
into growth rates to attain stationarity.26  Prior to applying the principal component analysis, 
these variables are further normalized.   
 
3.4 Variables Used in Identifying Output Shocks 
To compute the trade shares, we utilize the Asian International Input-Output (I-O) Table 
obtained from the Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization website.  
The table covers a total of nine countries (including the US) and 76 sectors, and is produced 
every five years. We use the year 2005 because it is the most recently available version.  To 
apply the information in the I-O table in identifying shocks, we need to map our sectors to the 
sectors in the I-O table.  Not every sector has a one-to-one match, but most of the mapping is 
fairly straightforward based on the definition provided in the I-O table. For example, Japanese 
output for cement and cement products (jpn_ip_ccem_g in our dataset) is matched with “Cement 
and cement products” in the I-O table (Sector code 038), whereas Japanese output for rubber 
products (jpn_ip_rubber_g) is assigned to “Tires and tubes” (Sector code 036) and “Other rubber 
products” (Sector code 037).27  
Table 1 summarizes the trade volumes between Japan and South Korea at the sector level 
using the information in the I-O table. The table shows that electrical machinery & appliances 
and basic metals are the two sectors with the largest bilateral trade.  These are also the sectors 
with relatively high shares of intermediate goods trade (column (b)), much of which occur within 
the same sector (column (c)). 
The trade volume that a given sector trades with foreign countries is based on both 
exports and imports.  On the exporting side, the trade volume is calculated as the sum of 
                                                            
26 In general, there is no pairwise cointegration between the industrial production indexes. Thus there is no reason to estimate 
error correction models.  
27 The complete list of correspondence is shown in Table 2, described below.  
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intermediate and final demand for a given sector, whereas on the importing side the trade volume 
is the amount of imported intermediate goods.  For example, the Japanese rubber sector has $249 
million of trade with South Korea (that is, $175 million of exports plus $74 million of imports), 
which accounts for 0.32% of the overall trade volume between Japan and South Korea. Thus, the 
Japanese rubber sector qualifies as a slow-moving variable in identifying the South Korean 
output shock (< 0.5%).28  The same process is repeated when identifying the sectoral shock in a 
given country.  
 
4. Main Result 
4.1 Principal Component Analysis 
Before turning to the FAVAR results, we provide a quick overview of principal 
components extracted from the 127 variables used in our baseline analysis.  Figure 2 reports the 
time series graphs of the three principal components before removing the direct dependence of 
the observed factor 𝑋!,!!"#.  All principal components show a large downward swing between 
2007-2010, which likely reflects the effect of the global recession.  However, the timing and the 
magnitude of the swings somewhat differs across principal components.   
These principal components are highly correlated with macroeconomic conditions in 
Japan and South Korea.  For example, first principal component is highly correlated with the 
output for both countries (r = 0.93 for Japan, 0.79 for South Korea), and it is also highly 
correlated with exports and imports for Japan (0.92 and 0.84) and spot exchange rate for South 
Korea (0.78).  Second principal component is highly correlated with the consumer price index of 
Japan (-0.74), and slightly less so with the consumer price index of South Korea (-0.35).  Third 
                                                            
28 The Japanese rubber sector is also used to identify the Chinese output shock (used in the later analysis), since its trade share is 
smaller than the predetermined threshold value (0.30%<0.5%).  However, it will not be used to identify the US output shock, 
because the ratio is 1.00% thus exceeding the 0.5% threshold. 
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principal component is highly correlated with the short-term interest rate of Japan (0.68) and the 
monetary aggregate of South Korea (0.55).  This exercise confirms that the economies of Japan 
and South Korea are closely tied to common international factors. 
 
4.2 The Overall Output Response to a Foreign Output Shock (Japan/South Korea) 
Figure 3 shows the response of the overall output of Japan to a positive 0.5 percentage 
point increase in the output of South Korea and the response of South Korea to Japan.  In the left 
panel, the output in Japan immediately increases following the South Korean output shock and it 
peaks around six months, which is later than that observed in the SVAR analysis (Figure 1).  The 
positive response is also statistically significant, as shown by the 90% confidence interval.29  
In the right panel, the output in South Korea rises slightly in response to the Japanese 
output shock (not statistically significant), but it quickly falls after a month and crosses the 
zeroline at around six months.  Overall this figure confirms the earlier SVAR results as shown in 
Figure 1, which finds a strong transmission of a South Korean output shock to Japan but a 
limited effect from Japan to South Korea. 
 
4.3 Sector-level Granger Causality Tests 
 We now examine how individual sectors in one country are affected by output shocks in 
the other country.  We first test whether the overall output of South Korea Granger-causes the 
sectoral output of Japan and then whether the overall output of Japan Granger-causes the sectoral 
output of South Korea.30  For this purpose, we use a reduced form vector autoregression 
𝑌! = Γ 𝐿 𝑌!!! + 𝜐! 
                                                            
29 The confidence interval is calculated using the bootstrap method proposed by Kilian (1998) and adopted by many FAVAR 
studies. 




where 𝑌! = 𝑌!",! ,𝑌!!!"#,! ,𝑌!"#,! ,𝑌!"#,! ,𝑌!,!,! ′ is a 5×1  vector of output series.  The first four 
variables represent the overall output at the country-level, whereas 𝑌!,!,! is the sectoral output for 
sector j in country c, Japan and South Korea.  We examine eight sectors in each country.31 As 
before, all variables are expressed in growth rates and the lag length is set to two months, as 
suggested by the Schwarz BIC criteria.   
Table 3 reports the results of the Granger causality tests in which we test the null 
hypotheses that 𝑌!"# does not Granger-cause 𝑌!"#,!,  and 𝑌!"# does not Granger-cause 𝑌!"#,!.  We 
find that the overall South Korean output Granger-causes five of the eight Japanese industries at 
the 5% significance level, whereas the overall Japanese industrial production also Granger-
causes five of the eight South Korean sectors.  However, there is an asymmetry between the two 
countries.  For example, South Korean overall output Granger-causes sectoral outputs of 
Japanese electrical machinery and basic metals, but the Japanese overall output does not 
Granger-cause outputs of the same South Korean sectors.  Likewise, the Japanese overall output 
Granger-causes sectoral outputs of South Korean electrical appliances and chemical, but the 
South Korean overall output does not Granger-cause outputs of the same Japanese sectors. 
 One limitation of this VAR-based test is that it cannot control for many relevant variables 
due to the degree of freedom constraint.  For that reason we now move to the FAVAR estimation 
that allows us to work with a larger information set. 
 
4.4 The Sectoral Output Response to a Foreign Output Shock (Japan/South Korea) 
                                                            
31 These sectors are electrical machinery (elecmach), motor vehicles (mv), electrical appliances (eappl for Japan, eequip for South 
Korea), other machinery (othmach), basic metals (ironsteel for Japan, pmetal for South Korea), chemicals (chem), petroleum/coal 
(petcoal),  plastics (plastic for Japan).  These are selected based on multiple criteria such as bilateral trade volume, size of value 
added, and relevance in terms of production complementarity across borders.  We distinguish electrical machinery and electrical 
appliances because they often deal with different type of markets/commodities.  In some cases, sector is defined slightly 




Figure 4 shows how individual sectors in one country respond to an overall output shock 
in the other country.  The positive shock in the overall output of South Korea generates positive 
responses in all the sectors in Japan, but the magnitude differs substantially according to sector.  
The sectors that incur the largest responses are electrical machinery, basic metals, and plastics.  
These are also the sectors that have the highest share in terms of the intermediate goods trade 
(see column (b) of Table 1).  In contrast, a positive Japanese output shock yields mixed 
responses in individual South Korean sectors.  Several sectors (e.g., other machinery and basic 
metals) show a significantly positive response in the beginning but the responses soon fall below 
the zeroline.  For most sectors, the responses turn negative within the first eight months (with the 
exception of petroleum/coal sector).   The heterogeneous responses across sectors are consistent 
with the tepid response in the overall South Korean output in the right panel of Figure 3.   
 We note that the FAVAR results are not always consistent with the Granger causality test 
results.  For example, the Granger causality test suggests no causal relationship between South 
Korean overall output and the Japanese electrical appliances, but the FAVAR impulse response 
shows strong response of Japanese electrical appliances to the South Korean overall output shock.  
Similarly for the petroleum/coal sector, Granger causality test suggests no causal relationship 
with overall output of either country, but the impulse responses of the sectoral output show a 
significant response.32  This suggests the merit of working with a larger dataset when analyzing 
business cycle transmission. 
 
5. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
5.1 Vertical production linkage   
                                                            
32 Other inconsistencies are observed in chemical and food sectors for Japan, and in electrical appliances and basic metals sector 
for South Korea. 
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Many studies have pointed out South Korea’s degree of vertical specialization is among 
the highest in the world.33 It is also well known that South Korea’s economy is relatively 
dependent on electronics and auto manufacturing, both involving production process that is 
vertically integrated across multiple countries.  It is possible that the output shock occurring in 
these South Korean sectors may generate a large intermediate goods demand from Japan that 
leads to the observed strong business cycle transmission from South Korea to Japan.  Thus in this 
section we examine whether the asymmetric responses are due to the vertical production linkage 
often seen in these two sectors. 
Figure 5 and 6 show the impulse responses of the shocks occurring in the electrical 
machinery sector and the motor vehicle sector.  These shocks are identified using the slow-
moving variables selected based on the international I-O table.  In Figure 5, we observe that both 
Japan and South Korea benefit from each other’s positive shock in the electrical machinery 
sector, but the magnitude of the response is larger for Japan than for South Korea.  The same 
asymmetric pattern is observed for many related sectors, such as motor vehicles, chemicals, and 
plastics.  In Figure 8, the motor vehicle shock in South Korea has a positive effect on all 
Japanese sectors, but the motor vehicle shock in Japan has almost no impact on South Korea.   
To dig deeper, we collected information on the direction of trade in these sectors between 
Japan and South Korea.  Table 4 presents the trade flows involving the electrical machinery 
sector.  For trade within the electrical machinery sector, Japan has a large trade surplus against 
South Korea (7,687.1 – 4,428.9 = $3,259.1mil.), which implies that the South Korean electrical 
machinery sector has a higher demand for products from Japan, relative to Japanese electrical 
machinery sector’s demand for South Korean products.  Table 4 also shows the general trade 
pattern that the electrical machinery sector imports crude and processed materials from material-
                                                            
33 See for example, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) and Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009). 
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related sectors (e.g., plastics) and exports electronic parts and components to other machinery-
related sectors (e.g., motor vehicles).  The latter indicates that the products in the electrical 
machinery sector are mostly used as intermediate goods in the production chain, rather than as 
the final use products.  For both of these upstream and downstream sectors, Japanese exports 
exceed South Korean exports in most cases.  Table 5 presents the trade flows involving the 
motor vehicle sector.  Again, Japan has a large trade surplus against South Korea within the 
motor vehicle sector (819.9 – 157.3 = $662.6mil.).  One key difference comparing with the 
electrical machinery sector is that much of the across-sector trades are in the form of exports 
from other sectors to the motor vehicle sector.  
When we compare sectoral impulse responses in Figure 5 with the trade flows in Table 4 
for the electrical machinery sector, we find an interesting pattern.   For three of the four upstream 
industries (metals, chemicals, and plastics products), the South Korean electrical machinery 
sector imports a relatively large amount from Japan (column (c) of Table 4), and the response of 
these Japanese sectors is also larger than that of South Korea.  In contrast, for the petroleum/coal 
products, the Japanese electrical machinery sector imports a relatively large amount from South 
Korea (column (a) of Table 4), and we find the response of South Korean petroleum/coal sector 
to be larger than that of Japan.  A similar pattern is also observed when we compare Figure 6 and 
Table 5 for the motor vehicle sector.  The motor vehicle sector in South Korea imports large 
volume from Japanese basic metal, chemical, and other machinery sectors, which produce steel, 
paint, and industrial robots used in car manufacturing.  
This exercise suggests that production complementarity across borders and the resulting 
vertical production linkages provide an important channel for business cycle transmission.  The 
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asymmetric impulse responses found here is also consistent with the earlier observation that the 
positive spillover effects pass from South Korea to Japan. 
 
5.2 The Overall Output Response to a US/China Output Shock 
Within the last two decades, South Korea has quickly deepened its trade relationship with 
China while reducing its trade dependence on the US and Japan.  This is often seen as an 
example of the “decoupling” of emerging Asia from the rest of the world.  To test this claim, we 
let China represent emerging Asia and the US represent the rest of the world.  We then examine 
how the output shocks of these countries affect both Japan and South Korea.   
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses for the overall and sectoral outputs of Japan and 
South Korea in response to a US overall output shock. For the overall output case, we observe 
that the Japanese output responds more positively to the US output shock than does the South 
Korean output.  Similar pattern is found for motor vehicle, which may reflect the local assembly 
that Japanese automakers have conducted since early 1980’s, much earlier than South Korea.34  
For electrical machinery, Japan’s response still exceeds that of South Korea, but the confidence 
interval is quite wide. 
Figure 8 shows the same set of responses to a Chinese overall output shock. The overall 
output responses of Japan and South Korea look similar in shape and slightly larger for Japan in 
magnitude.  For the sectoral responses, both Japanese and South Korean sectors equally benefit 
from the Chinese output shock.  This result is in line with other finding of global production 
sharing that reports China is heavily involved in the final assembly of electronic items and 
passenger cars. 
                                                            
34 According to Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, and Gereffi (2008), the cumulative number of assembly plant investment by 
Japanese auto companies has reached 17 in 2004, whereas the same number for South Korean companies was two. 
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This experiment suggests that Japan and South Korea are positively affected by the US 
and China. But the positive response of South Korean output to the Chinese output shock is more 
significant than the response to the US shock (particularly for electrical machinery), which 
supports the “decoupling” view mentioned earlier.  Moreover, we find that the magnitude of 
responses is consistent with the pattern of global production sharing in each sectors reported by 
many studies.   
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
6.1 Variable Choices 
Our choice of variables in the baseline specification is primarily based on Selover (2004).  
In this section, we run some alternative specifications to examine the sensitivity of our results to 
variable choice.  Specifically, three alternative FAVAR models are run: (1) exclude sectoral 
outputs of Japan and South Korea from the baseline, (2) exclude monetary aggregates and short-
term interest rates from the baseline, and (3) add real exchange rate indexes and international 
reserves to the baseline.  The first specification tests whether sectoral variables provide any 
additional information, whereas the second and third specifications test whether the transmission 
occurs through financial channels. The results are shown in Figure A.2 of the Appendix. 
In all three specifications, Japan’s response to South Korean output shock remains above 
South Korea’s response to Japanese output shock for most of the time, which is consistent with 
the baseline.  The largest difference is seen in the first specification in which sectoral variables 
are excluded.  Initially South Korean output jumps up higher than the Japanese output, but then it 
falls sharply in the next six months.  This sudden jump is most likely because a large portion of 
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the slow-moving variables used in the baseline identification cannot be used in this specification.  
As a result, both outputs are allowed to respond more strongly.   
Despite the improvements of policy coordination between central banks through such 
institutions as the Executive’s Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks, our results show 
that financial variables do not matter much in transmitting business cycles between Japan and 
South Korea. 
 
6.2 Allowing a Fast-Moving Factor 
Here we consider an alternative specification in which the timing of the observed output 
factor is changed from the baseline specification.  There may be an unobserved “fast-moving” 
factor that responds contemporaneously to the change in observed output factor and generates an 
important feedback mechanism in the estimated FAVAR.  Thus we augment the vector of factors 








+ 𝜐!  , 
where 𝐹!"#$,! is the principal component extracted from a set of pre-specified variables which 
supposedly respond to the output shock within the same month.  We consider three alternative 
sets of fast-moving variables, and the resulting FAVAR is compared to the baseline result: (1) 
spot exchange rates, (2) spot exchange rates and short-term interest rates, (3) spot exchange rates, 
short-term interest rates, monetary aggregates, consumer price indexes, and trade volumes. 
 The results are shown in Figure A.3 of the Appendix.  In all three specifications, the 
responses look very similar to the baseline, in that the Japanese response to South Korean output 
shock exceeds the South Korean response to Japanese output shock for most of the time horizon. 
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For specifications (2) and (3), the South Korean response is slightly larger for the first three 
months, but the gap quickly reverses thereafter.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 This paper re-examined the interdependence between Japan and South Korea from the 
perspective of industrial sectors.  We used sectoral industrial production indexes as a measure for 
output and analyzed them with a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model. To 
our knowledge there are no other papers that have used FAVAR models, in combination with 
international input-output tables, to directly model the sectoral interdependence between 
different countries. 
There are two main findings in this paper.  First, we find that the nature of the 
interdependence between Japan and South Korea has changed from the earlier period.  While 
Japanese output shocks do not affect the South Korean economy, South Korean output shocks do 
affect the Japanese economy in a significant manner.  Such asymmetry is found at both the 
aggregate and at the sectoral level.  Second, we find that the same type of asymmetric spillover 
effect exists between Japan and South Korea in two important sectors (electrical machinery and 
motor vehicle sectors).  This asymmetric pattern is largely consistent with the direction of trade 
within the sector and across related sectors.  Our results indicate that cross-border production 
sharing can be an important business cycle transmission channel.  In addition to our main results, 
we confirm that both the US and Chinese output shocks have positive spillover effects on Japan 
and South Korea, with China having a stronger effect on South Korea than the US.  
These findings have important implications for the ongoing policy debate regarding free-
trade agreements (FTA) such as China-Japan-Korea FTA and Regional Comprehensive 
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Economic Partnership.  The purpose of FTAs in general is to promote stronger economic 
integration and freer trade and to create a win-win situation for all participating countries.  Based 
on our findings, Japan seems to enjoy production complementarities with South Korea more than 
South Korea does with Japan.  For the FTAs to be successful in the future, it is important that 
South Korea further diversifies its current industrial structure such that production 
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Composition of Trade between Japan and South Korea 
 
 (a) Trade vol., 
overall,  
in $mil. 
(b) Trade vol., 
intermed. use, 
in $mil. 
(c) Trade vol., 
same-sector,  
 in $mil. 
  Elec.machinery & appliances (048-054) 18,854 15,654 12,976 
  Basic metals (041-042) 9,713 9,377 5,918 
  Other machinery (044-047) 8,017 3,039 1,338 
  Chemicals (029-033) 7,872 7,375 4,273 
  Petroleum/coal (034) 4,702 3,953 139 
  Plastics (035-037) 2,135 1,933 567 
  Motor vehicles (055-058) 2,026 1,113 1,023 
  Nonmetallic minerals (038-040) 1,431 1,277 472 
  Food (012-017) 1,235 660 365 
  Textiles/leather (018-023) 1,092 348 206 
  Wood/paper (024-028) 940 662 307 
  Agriculture (001-007) 481 375 26 
  Mining (008-011) 89 89 0 
  Trade (065-066) 14,117 9,988 3,140 
  Services (067-075) 1,877 1,361 759 
  Other sectors 3,198 1,524 465 
Total 77,781 58,728 31,972 
 
 
Note: The trade volumes are calculated as the sum of exports between the two countries. The number in the parentheses 






























List of Slow-Moving Variables Used in Identifying Shocks 
 
























 1 jpn_ip_mgs (8-60)         
 2 jpn_ip_goods (12-60)         
 3 jpn_ip_ironsteel_g (41)       *  
 4 jpn_ip_steel_g (41)       *  
 5 jpn_ip_nfmetal_g (42)         
 6 jpn_ip_fmetal_g (43)       *  
 7 jpn_ip_machine_g (44)       *  
 8 jpn_ip_eappl_g (53-54)  * * *    * 
 9 jpn_ip_comp_g (50)        * 
 10 jpn_ip_mv_g (55-58)         
 11 jpn_ip_car_g (55)         
 12 jpn_ip_truck_g (55)         
 13 jpn_ip_vparts_g (55)       *  
 14 jpn_ip_mc_g (56)  *  *    * 
 15 jpn_ip_cars_g (55)         
 16 jpn_ip_ccem_g (38)  * * *   * * 
 17 jpn_ip_chem_g (29-33)         
 18 jpn_ip_petcoal_g (34)   *    * * 
 19 jpn_ip_petro_g (34)   *    * * 
 20 jpn_ip_coal_g (34)   *    * * 
 21 jpn_ip_plastic_g (35)         
 22 jpn_ip_paper_g (27  *     * * 
 23 jpn_ip_tt_g (18-22)   *    * * 
 24 jpn_ip_spun_g (18)  * * *   * * 
 25 jpn_ip_apparel_g (20-21)  * * *   * * 
 26 jpn_ip_foods_g (12-15,17)       * * 
 27 jpn_ip_dairy_g (14)  * * *   * * 
 28 jpn_ip_bev_g (16)  * * *   * * 
 29 jpn_ip_rubber_g (36-37)  *  *   *  
 30 jpn_ip_leath_g (23)  * * *   * * 
 31 jpn_ip_furn_g (25)  * * *   * * 
 32 jpn_ip_wood_g (24-26)  * * *   * * 
 33 jpn_ip_mins (8-11)  * * *   * * 
 34 jpn_ip_elecmach_g (48-52)         
 35 kor_ip_mugs (8-61)         
 36 kor_ip_mgs (8-60)         
 37 kor_ip_mins (8-11) *  * * *    
 38 kor_ip_oilgas_m (8) *  * * * *   
 39 kor_ip_iron_m (9-10) *  * * * *   
 40 kor_ip_nmetal_m (11) *  * * * *   
 41 kor_ip_goods (12-60)         
 42 kor_ip_food_g (12-15)     * *   
 43 kor_ip_bev_g (16) *   * * *   
 44 kor_ip_tobacc_g (17) *  * * * *   
 45 kor_ip_tt_g (18-22)     * *   
 46 kor_ip_apparel_g (21) *    * *   
 47 kor_ip_leath_g (23) *  *  * *   
 48 kor_ip_wood_g (24-26) *  * * * *   
 49 kor_ip_paper_g (27)     * *   
 50 kor_ip_print_g (28) *  * * * *   
 51 kor_ip_petcoal_g (34)     *    
 52 kor_ip_chem_g (29-30,33)     *    
 53 kor_ip_drugs_g (31-32)    * * *   
 54 kor_ip_plastics_g (35-37)     *    
 55 kor_ip_nmetals_g (38-40)     *    
 56 kor_ip_pmetal_g (41-42)         
 57 kor_ip_fmetal_g (43)     *    
 58 kor_ip_elecmach_g (48-52)         
 59 kor_ip_watches_g (59)      *   
 60 kor_ip_eequip_g (53-54)         
 61 kor_ip_othmachs_g (44-47)         
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
List of Slow-Moving Variables Used in Identifying Shocks 
 
 
























 62 kor_ip_mv_g (55)         
 63 kor_ip_ot_g (56-58)         
 64 kor_ip_furn_g (25) *  * * * *   
 65 kor_ip_misc_g (60) *   * * *   
 66 kor_ip_utils (61) *  *  * *   
 67 us_ip_mins (8-11)     * * * * 
 68 us_ip_tt_g (18-20) * *  * * * * * 
 69 us_ip_al_g (21-23) *    * * * * 
 70 us_ip_wood_g (24-26) * *   * * * * 
 71 us_ip_petcoal_g (34) *   * * * * * 
 72 us_ip_chem_g (29-33)      *  * 
 73 us_ip_plastic_g (35-37)      *  * 
 74 us_ip_nmetal_g (38-40) * *  * * * * * 
 75 us_ip_pmetal_g (41-42)      *   
 76 us_ip_fmetal_g (43)      *   
 77 us_ip_machine_g (44-47)         
 78 us_ip_elecmach_g (48-52)         
 79 us_ip_eequip_g (53-54)  *    *  * 
 80 us_ip_goods (12-60)         
 81 us_ip_dg_g (24-26, 38-59)         




Note: An asterisk means that the variable is chosen as the slow-moving variable in the identification of shocks.  The number in 































Sectoral Granger Causality Tests 
 
Japanese Sectors  South Korean Sectors  
Relationship p-value Relationship p-value 
    
(Machinery-related sectors)    
    Kor IP → Jpn Elec.machine   0.00** Jpn IP → Kor Elec.machine   0.08 
    Kor IP → Jpn Motor vehicle   0.03* Jpn IP → Kor Motor vehicle   0.04* 
    Kor IP → Jpn Elec.appliances   0.17 Jpn IP → Kor Elec.appliances   0.04* 
    Kor IP → Jpn other Machine   0.00** Jpn IP → Kor other Machine   0.05* 
    
(Material-related sectors)    
    Kor IP → Jpn Basic Metals   0.00** Jpn IP → Kor Basic Metals   0.15 
    Kor IP → Jpn Chem   0.18 Jpn IP → Kor Chem   0.05* 
    Kor IP → Jpn Pet/coal   0.43 Jpn IP → Kor Pet/coal   0.25 
    Kor IP → Jpn Plastic   0.00** Jpn IP → Kor Plastics   0.01* 
                   * = sig at .05 level,  ** = sig at .01 level 
 
 Note: The null hypothesis the non-causality of the excluded variables, which are South Korean output (“Kor IP”) and 
Japanese output (“Jpn IP”) on the sectoral variables of each country.  Sample period is 2000.1-2012.12. Lag 






Trade Flows Between Japan and South Korea Involving 
Electrical Machinery Sector 
 
  Japan’s electrical 
machinery sector 
South Korea’s electrical 
machinery sector 
Sector type Sector j (a)  Import 
from Kor j 
(b)  Export 
to Kor j 
(c)  Import 
from Jpn j 
(d)  Export 
to Jpn j 
  in $mil. in $mil. in $mil. in $mil. 
Shock sector Electrical machinery (048-052) 4,428.0 7,687.1 7,687.1 4,428.0 
      
Materials Basic metals (041-042) 80.7  25.3  231.7  0.2  
 Chemicals (029-033) 25.1 230.0 779.1 1.3 
 Petroleum/coal (034) 10.7 2.4  0.7 0.0  
 Plastics (035-037) 22.9  1.1  625.9  0.2  
 Subtotal (029-037, 041-042) 139.4 258.7 1,637.3 1.8 
      
Machinery Motor vehicles (055-058) 0.0 430.3 1.7 186.3 
 Electrical appliances (053-054) 35.1 120.9 0.0 191.0 
 Other machineries (044-047) 41.7 230.0 21.4 59.0 
 Subtotal (044-047, 053-058) 76.8 781.2 23.1 436.3 
Tot. intermed. demand (001-076) 5,297.5  10,221.8  12,036.4  5,316.0 
Tot. final demand   n.a.  1,308.4  n.a.  1,778.6  
 
 





































Trade Flows Between Japan and South Korea Involving 
Motor Vehicles Sector 
 
  Japan’s motor 
vehicles sector 
South Korea’s motor 
vehicles sector 
Sector type Sector j (a)  Import 
from Kor j 
(b)  Export 
to Kor j 
(c)  Import 
from Jpn j 
(d)  Export 
to Jpn j 
  in $mil. in $mil. in $mil. in $mil. 
Shock sector Motor vehicles (055-058) 157.3 819.9 819.9 157.3 
      
Materials Basic metals (041-042) 247.4 0.4 888.2 0.0 
 Chemicals (029-033) 26.5 0.9 66.3 0.0 
 Petroleum/coal (034) 22.2 0.2 1.5 0.0 
 Plastics (035-037) 86.2 0.1 51.3 0.0 
 Subtotal (029-037, 041-042) 382.3 1.6 1,007.3 0.0 
      
Machinery Electrical machinery (048-052) 186.3 1.7 774.3 0.0 
 Electrical appliances (053-054) 13.7 0.1 0.3 0.0 
 Other machineries (044-047) 8.7 11.4 498.7 0.0 
 Subtotal (044-054) 208.6 13.2 1,273.3 0.0 
      
Tot. intermed. demand (001-076) 881.8 935.2 2,526.6 157.3 
Tot. final demand   n.a. 680.4 n.a. 225.1 
 
 































Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Overall Industrial Production to  








































Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese and South Korean industrial production (“Jpn IP”, 
“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the overall industrial production in the other country (“Kor shock”, “Jpn 
shock”).  The responses are drawn using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) described in Selover (2004). The dash-
dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals associated with the SVAR impulse response.  All variables are 
































































Resp.of Kor IP to Jpn shock: 2000−2012
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Note: Each panel presents the time series for principal components extracted from the 127 


































Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Overall Industrial Production to  
Country-Level Industrial Production Shocks (FAVAR) 
 
 
Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese and South Korean industrial production (“Jpn IP”, 
“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the overall industrial production in the other country (“Kor shock”, “Jpn 
shock”).  The responses are drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR).  The dashed lines represent 
the 90% confidence intervals associated with the FAVAR impulse response.  All variables are expressed in terms of 
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Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Sectoral Industrial Production to  
Country-Level Industrial Production Shocks (FAVAR) 
 
















































Resp.of Jpn elec machine to Kor shock











Resp.of Jpn motor vehicles to Kor shock











Resp.of Jpn elec.appliances to Kor shock











Resp.of Jpn oth.machine to Kor shock







Resp.of Kor elec machine to Jpn shock







Resp.of Kor motor vehicles to Jpn shock







Resp.of Kor elec.appliances to Jpn shock















Figure 4 (continued) 
 
Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Sectoral Industrial Production to  
Country-Level Industrial Production Shocks (FAVAR) 
 









































Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese and South Korean industrial production (“Jpn IP”, 
“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the overall industrial production in the other country (“Kor shock”, “Jpn shock”).  
The responses are drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). The dashed lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals associated with the FAVAR impulse response.  All variables are expressed in terms of growth rates (%).   
 











Resp.of Jpn basic metals to Kor shock











Resp.of Jpn chemicals to Kor shock











Resp.of Jpn pet/coal to Kor shock











Resp.of Jpn plastics to Kor shock







Resp.of Kor basic metals to Jpn shock







Resp.of Kor chemicals to Jpn shock







Resp.of Kor pet/coal to Jpn shock












Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Sectoral Industrial Production to  







































Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese sectoral industrial production (“jpn:xx”) to a 0.5 
percentage point shock in the South Korean industrial production in electronic machinery.  The dashed line presents the 
impulse response of South Korean sectoral industrial production (“kor:xx”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the Japanese 
industrial production in electronic machinery.  The responses are drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression 














Response of Elec.machinery 
 
 








Response of Motor vehicles 
 
 








Response of Elec.appliances 
 
 









Response of Other machinery
 
 





Response of Basic metal 
 
 




Response of Chemicals 
 
 




Response of Petroleum/coal 
 
 









































Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Sectoral Industrial Production to  







































Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese sectoral industrial production (“jpn:xx”) to a 0.5 
percentage point shock in the South Korean industrial production in motor vehicles.  The dashed line presents the impulse 
response of South Korean sectoral industrial production (“kor:xx”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the Japanese 
industrial production in motor vehicles.  The responses are drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression 












































































































Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Sectoral Industrial Production to  

































Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese and South Korean industrial production (“Jpn IP”, 
“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the overall industrial production in the US (“US shock”).  The responses are 
drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR).  The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals 























Response of Jpn IP 
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Response of Jpn elec machine 







Response of Kor elec machine 











Response of Jpn motor vehicles 







Response of Kor motor vehicles 











Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Sectoral Industrial Production to  

































Note: The solid line in each panel represents the impulse responses of Japanese and South Korean industrial production (“Jpn IP”, 
“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the overall industrial production in China (“China shock”).  The responses are 
drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR).  The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals 























Response of Jpn IP 
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Response of Jpn elec machine 







Response of Kor elec machine 











Response of Jpn motor vehicles 











APPENDIX A: Data Used in Estimating FAVAR 
 
The list of variables are reported in Table A.1.  All series are taken from the following sources: 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), Bank of Korea ECOS system 
(BofK), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems (Fed), Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan (MEA), Bank of Thailand (BOT), Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Malaysia 
External Trade Statistics (METS), Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), IMF International 
Financial Statistics database (IFS), Global Financial Database (GFD).  Mnemonics are provided 
by the authors to reflect the contents covered. 
Each variable is sub-divided into eight categories as 1. aggregate industrial production, 2. 
disaggregated index of industrial production, 3. trade volume, 4. consumer price index, 5. spot 
exchange rates, 6. money supply, 7. interest rates, 8. real exchange rate index, 9. international 
reserves, 10. recession indicators.  Variables 1-7 are used in the baseline FAVAR estimation; 8, 
9 are used in the robustness check analysis; Variables 150-153 are used to construct the recession 
dummy variable commonly used in all FAVAR specification.  Variables with asterisk are used in 
the SVAR analysis of Section 2.1. 
The transformation codes are 1 – no transformation or 5 – year over year growth rate.  
We remove outliers following the rule suggested by Stock and Watson (2005), i.e. replace 
observations with absolute median deviations larger than six times the interquartile range with 






























Table A.1  
 
Description of Data 
 
1. Aggregate Industrial Production 
1. jpn_ip_oecd* 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: Production of Total Industry (Index 
2010=100); s.a. 
FRED 
2. kor_ip_oecd* 2000:01-2012:12 5 South Korea: Production of Total Industry 














2000:01-2012:12 5 Taiwan: Industrial Production Index, 




2000:01-2012:12 5 Thailand: Industrial Production Volume; 
s.a. 
FRED 




2. Disaggregated Index of Industrial Production (IIP) 
8. jpn_ip_mgs 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Mining and manufacturing; s.a. 
 
METI 





2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Iron and steel; s.a. 
 
METI 
11. jpn_ip_steel_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Ordinary steel; s.a. 
 
METI 
12. jpn_ip_nfmetal_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Non-ferrous metals; s.a. 
 
METI 





2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: General machinery; s.a. 
 
METI 
15. jpn_ip_eappl_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Household electrical machinery; 
s.a. 
METI 
16. jpn_ip_comp_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Electronic computers; s.a. 
 
METI 
17. jpn_ip_mv_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Transport equipment; s.a. 
 
METI 
18. jpn_ip_car_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Passenger cars; s.a. 
 
METI 
19. jpn_ip_truck_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Trucks; s.a. 
 
METI 
20. jpn_ip_vparts_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Motor vehicle parts; s.a. 
 
METI 
21. jpn_ip_mc_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Motorcycles; s.a. 
 
METI 
22. jpn_ip_cars_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Passenger cars, buses and 
trucks; s.a. 
METI 
23. jpn_ip_ccem_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Cement and cement products; 
s.a. 
METI 
24. jpn_ip_chem_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Chemicals; s.a. 
 
METI 
25. jpn_ip_petcoal_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Petroleum and coal products; 
s.a. 
METI 
26. jpn_ip_petro_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Petroleum products; s.a. 
 
METI 





28. jpn_ip_plastic_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Plastic products; s.a. 
 
METI 
29. jpn_ip_paper_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Pulp, paper and paper products; 
s.a. 
METI 
30. jpn_ip_tt_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Textiles; s.a. 
 
METI 
31. jpn_ip_spun_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Spun yarn; s.a. 
 
METI 
32. jpn_ip_apparel_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Clothes; s.a. 
 
METI 
33. jpn_ip_foods_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Foods and tobacco; s.a. 
 
METI 
34. jpn_ip_dairy_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Dairy products; s.a. 
 
METI 
35. jpn_ip_bev_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Beverages; s.a. 
 
METI 
36. jpn_ip_rubber_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Rubber products; s.a. 
 
METI 





2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Furniture; s.a. 
 
METI 
39. jpn_ip_wood_g 2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: IIP: Wood and wood products; s.a. 
 
METI 

























2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Mining: Petroleum, Crude 







































2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Wearing apparel, Clothing 




2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Tanning and Dressing of 




2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Wood and Products of Wood 









2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Printing and Reproduction of 




2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Coke, hard-coal and lignite 












2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal 

























2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Electronic Components, 
Computer, Radio, Television and 





2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: IIP: Medical, Precision and 













































2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Textiles and products  (NAICS = 




2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Apparel and leather goods  









2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Petroleum and coal products  









2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Plastics and rubber products  




2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Nonmetallic mineral product  









2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Fabricated metal product  (NAICS 









2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Computer and electronic product  




2000:01-2012:12 5 US: IIP: Electrical equipment, appliance, 















3. Trade Volume 
89. jpn_ex_oecd 
 













































2000:01-2012:12 5 US: Imports: Value Goods; s.a. 
 
FRED 















2000:01-2012:12 5 Malaysia: Total Imports; n.s.a. 
 
METS 
4. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
103. jpn_cpi_oecd* 
 

























2000:01-2012:12 5 Malaysia: Consumer Price Index; n.s.a. 
 
FRED 
5. Exchange Rates  
109. jpn_erusd_fed* 
 

























2000:01-2012:12 5 Malaysia/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate; 
n.s.a. 
FRED 
6. Money Supply  
115. jpn_m2_oecd 
 

















2000:01-2012:12 5 China: M2; s.a. FRED 
119. twn_m2_gfd 
 





2000:01-2012:12 5 Malaysia: M2 Money Supply; n.s.a. 
 
GFD 
7. Interest Rates 
121. jpn_ir_oecd* 
   
2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: Immediate Rate: Less Than 24 




2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: Immediate Rate: Less Than 24 




2000:01-2012:12 5 US: Immediate Rate: Less Than 24 Hours: 




2000:01-2012:12 5 China: Immediate Rate: Less Than 24 
Hours: Call Money/Interbank Rate; n.s.a. 
FRED 
125. twn_ir_gfd 
   









   
2000:01-2012:12 5 Malaysia: Overnight Interbank Rate; n.s.a. 
 
GFD 
8. Real Exchange Rate Index 
128. jpn_rer_bis 
   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   
2000:01-2012:12 5 Japan: Real Effective Exchange Rate Based 
on Manufacturing CPI; n.s.a. 
FRED 
140. kor_rer_p_oecd 
   
2000:01-2012:12 5 S. Korea: Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Based on Manufacturing CPI; n.s.a. 
FRED 
141. us_rer_p_oecd 
   
2000:01-2012:12 5 US: Real Effective Exchange Rate Based on 
Manufacturing CPI; n.s.a. 
FRED 
142. china_p_rer_oecd 
   
2000:01-2012:12 5 China: Real Effective Exchange Rate Based 
on Manufacturing CPI; n.s.a. 
FRED 
9. International Reserves 
143. jpn_res_ifs 
   




   







   




   




   




   
2000:01-2012:12 5 Thailand: Total Foreign Exchange Reserves 




2000:01-2012:12 5 Malaysia: Total Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Excluding Gold; n.s.a. 
 
GFD 
10. Other variables 
150. jpnrecm   2000:01-2012:12 5 OECD based Recession Indicators for Japan 
from the Peak through the Trough 
FRED 
151. korrecm   2000:01-2012:12 5 OECD based Recession Indicators for 
Korea from the Peak through the Trough 
FRED 
152. usrecm   2000:01-2012:12 5 NBER based Recession Indicators for the 
United States from the Peak through the 
Trough 
FRED 
153. chnrecm   2000:01-2012:12 5 OECD based Recession Indicators for 
China from the Peak through the Trough 
FRED 
154. wti_gov* 2000:01-2012:12 5 Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate 











































Graphs of the Major Macroeconomic Measures  






































Note: Each panel represents the time series for Japan (solid line) and South Korea (dashed line).  The sample period is 
2000:1 – 2012:12.  r is the pairwise correlation coefficient between the Japanese and South Korean time series.  All 
variables except the short-term interest rate are transformed into year-over-year growth rates and expressed in 
annual percentage terms.  Spot exchange rate is exchange rate of local currency per one US dollar. For data source, 
see the data appendix.  
 
 










Index of industrial production (r=0.69)
 
 






Consumer price index (r=0.44)












Trade volume: export (r=0.24)








Trade volume: import (r=0.56)










Spot exchange rate (r=−0.06)
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Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Overall Industrial Production  
























Note: The solid line in each panel presents the impulse response of Japanese industrial production (“Jpn IP”) to a 0.5 percentage 
point shock in the South Korean industrial production and the dashed line presents the impulse response of South Korean 
industrial production (“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the Japanese industrial production.  Alternative Datasets 
are (1) exclude sectoral output of Japan and South Korea from the baseline (“no J/K disagg.”), (2) exclude monetary 
aggregates and short-term interest rates from the baseline (“no fin.vars”), and (3) add real exchange rate indexes and 
international reserves to the baseline (“with real forex, reserves”).The responses are drawn using a factor augmented vector 




























Dataset: Baseline (127 vars)
 
 







Alt.dataset 1: no J/K disagg.(80 vars)











Alt.dataset 2: no fin.vars (114 vars)
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Impulse Responses of Japanese and South Korean Overall Industrial Production  
























Note: The solid line in each panel presents the impulse response of Japanese industrial production (“Jpn IP”) to a 0.5 percentage 
point shock in the South Korean industrial production and the dashed line presents the impulse response of South Korean 
industrial production (“Kor IP”) to a 0.5 percentage point shock in the Japanese industrial production.  Fast-moving factor 
is extracted from (1) spot exchange rates (“forex”), (2) spot exchange rates and short-term interest rates (“forex,int.rates”), 
(3) spot exchange rates, short-term interest rates, monetary aggregates, consumer price indexes, and trade volumes 
(“forex,int.rates,Ms,CPI,trade vol.”). The responses are drawn using a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). 
All variables are expressed in terms of growth rates (%). 










Fast vars: Baseline (=no fast vars)
 
 






Fast vars 1: forex










Fast vars 2: forex, int.rates






Fast vars 3: forex,int.rates,Ms,CPI,trade vol.
Jpn IP
Kor IP
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